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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the link between democratizing states in the post-Cold 
War era and their level of bilateral cooperation with the United States. The hypothesis is 
that as states become more democratic, they will cooperate more with the United States 
economically and politically. The proposition can be seen as an extension of democratic 
peace theory and the results have implications for foreign policy strategies, like the 
promotion of democracy abroad. This study specifically looks at the universe of countries 
that are transitioning towards democracy, excluding established democracies and 
countries that are stagnant or regressing. The dependent variables used in this study are: 
the number of bilateral economic and security treaties with the U.S.; and trade with the 
U.S. as a percentage of the country’s total trade over the time period from 1993 - 2011. 
The independent variables used to explain cooperation are: democratization; per capita 
GDP; economic aid from the U.S.; military aid from the U.S.; and the presence of U.S. 
military troops. Using regression analysis, evidence is found to support a relationship 
between democratization and bilateral treaties, but there was no significant relationship 
with trade. Additionally, per capita GDP is positively correlated with trade, though it is 
negatively correlated to the number of treaties. Military presence is also correlated with 
trade. It should be noted that the small number of treaties for each country means the data 
can easily be skewed by large outliers. The outliers are controlled for with robustness 
tests, which agree with the original models. It is further tested with a negative binomial 
regression, as the treaties represent count variables. This regression also generally 
supports the findings of the first two sets of models. The findings lend some support the 
hypothesis that the democratization process will lead to increased cooperation with the 
United States.  
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Chapter 1: Rationale 
 In recent years, the theory that democracies are more likely to be peaceful has 
been used to justify foreign policy decisions. U.S. presidents, including George W. Bush, 
have tried to put this theory to the test. Long a pillar of U.S. foreign policy, encouraging 
the spread of democracy has been justified by this theory. Bush took this theory to an 
extreme, using it to justify forcing regime change in the Middle East through military 
means. This in turn was to be a catalyst for democratization in the Middle East, which 
hopefully would increase cooperation among these states and between them and the U.S. 
A democratic Middle East, the argument said, would lead to greater peace on the one 
hand, exemplified by reduced terrorism and war in the region, and to greater prosperity 
through more beneficial trade relationships. The promotion of democracy in the Middle 
East and globally has been a priority of United States foreign policy and foreign 
assistance programs. The goal of this promotion is closer economic and political 
relationships that will lead to greater peace, stability and prosperity. 
Cooperation like this and is one of the major points of discussion among scholars 
of international relations. Scholars differ greatly in how possible they believe cooperation 
is and in which situations it is likely to occur. Realists believe that cooperation, beyond 
military alliances, is not probable, because states will cheat to ensure that their efforts 
leave them in the best position possible. To the realist, who is most concerned with how 
states consolidate power, cooperation only makes sense in the form of alliances. These 
security arrangements can increase a state’s power on the global stage. 
Liberal theorists, on the other hand, believe that international cooperation is 
possible and that there are ways to can control for cheating. Not only do they think it 
possible, but, in fact, liberal theorists envision cooperation as the ideal situation. 
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Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace, for example, envisions the international system slowly 
evolving through the development of a federation of states. Such a federation would be 
characterized by cooperation, not motivated by a desire for power, but centered around 
preventing war. Kant envisioned the federation growing until it ultimately was comprised 
of all states of the world and the world would be at peace. Another major approach is the 
democratic peace theory, which is a sub-theory of liberalism. According to the 
democratic peace theory, democracies do not go to war with other democracies. While 
the theory is framed negatively, in terms of what democracies do not do, an extension 
could be considered, looking at how democracies interact with each other. Since they 
maintain peaceful relations, one might expect that they would have more than just a 
neutral relationship and that they would in fact cooperate more with one another than 
with other states. While democracies do not go to war with each other, they do go to war 
with non-democracies. This shows a greater difference in the type of relations they have 
with other democracies as opposed to non-democracies. Since there is a possibility of 
conflict with non-democracies, democratic states are less likely to cooperate with them 
and more likely to cooperate with other democracies. A democratic state like the U.S. 
should be more likely to have cooperative relationships with other democracies, as 
opposed to with non-democracies. The idea here is to extend the idea of democratic peace 
to democratic cooperation. 
 Established democracies, such as those countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), do have strong relations both in trade 
and politically. As a state gradually moves from being a non-democracy to a democracy, 
does it gradually increase its trade and political relations with other democracies? This 
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seems plausible, though, alternatively, it is possible that the state first reaches a level of 
democracy that is a tipping point. In this case, before that point there is no noticeable 
change in such relations, but after it, the relations improve very quickly. The question is 
whether merely democratizing, that is, moving towards being more democratic, is enough 
to cause a state to cooperate more with other democracies. According to the theory, 
democratizing states may not cooperate more with democracies until they become fully 
democratic. Hence, in this thesis I want to test whether or not they do. Because the U.S. is 
the largest democracy and world economy, I have chosen to look at whether they are 
more likely to cooperate with the U.S. Though China is on the rise, economically and 
militarily, the U.S. has been the sole dominant force over the last two decades. As such, it 
is reasonable to suppose that it would stand to gain more than other countries as other 
states democratized. A close inspection of the bilateral political and economic relations 
between the U.S. and democratizing nations is necessary to see if the U.S. has indeed 
benefited from its relations with democratizing states. 
 Even if such an increase in bilateral relations can be observed, there are other 
factors that could cause an increase. For example, it is possible that the improved 
relations come as a result of aid dependence. Since the U.S. doles out quite a bit of 
military and economic aid, states may want to improve relations in order to ensure that 
the flows of aid continue. According to the literature, trade may also result from the 
presence of U.S. military forces in some states. On the one hand, the presence of these 
forces could be seen as having a coercive component leading a state to cooperate more 
with the U.S. out of fear. On the other hand, it is possible that agreements were reached 
that gave certain economic concessions in exchange for the U.S. maintaining a military 
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presence in the given state. Bruce Moon points out that, in some cases, the transfer of aid 
is more important to the U.S. than it is to the recipient.1 One of the reasons for this, he 
says, is that the American banking system would suffer from countries that are unable to 
pay their debts. Another plausible explanation for improved relations is that the state in 
question has become wealthier, as measured by per capita GDP. As per capita GDP 
grows, the state will need markets to sell its exports, leading to an increase in trade in 
general. As it increases its exports, it may seek to sell these in one of the largest markets, 
the United States, making the U.S. a more significant trading partner. It also will be 
looking to import goods in order to satisfy growing demand. Again, as the U.S. is a very 
large exporter, there is a high potential for an increase in trade. 
 In the following pages, I intend to examine the patterns in relations between the 
United States and democratizing countries. I hope to identify which of the explanations 
the evidence supports. In theory, democratization is the main reason for an increase in 
political and economic cooperation, but it is possible that one of the other explanations is 
a greater factor. 
This topic is very important as it has both foreign policy implications. If it is true 
that countries do have better relations with the United States as they become more 
democratic, then it justifies the money currently being spent on promoting democracy 
and would be a strong argument for increasing that amount. Also, this piece would pave 
the way for more comprehensive studies focusing on democracies in general, or 
examining relations of all countries with the United States.
                                                
1 Bruce E. Moon, “Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence,” 
International Organization 39, no. 2 (1985): 297–329. p.301 
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Context 
 The intention of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which democratization in 
other countries has a beneficial effect on bilateral relations with the United States. My 
hypothesis is that as a country becomes more democratic, it will cooperate more with the 
U.S. Politically, this cooperation can be gauged by the number of bilateral agreements a 
country has with the U.S. Economically, total trade between the two states is an indicator 
of their cooperation. Does a democratizing country enter into more bilateral agreements 
with the U.S.? Does a change in regime type also result in better trade relations? This 
paper will examine evidence to determine whether or not this hypothesis can be 
supported.  
 There are a number of underlying assumptions that this study relies upon. One is 
the assumption that states are behaving as rational actors and making decisions based on 
their own interests. As such, the U.S. policymakers make decisions on cooperation, trade, 
aid, and military issues because the country stands to gain from those decisions. The 
United States is the dominant power in the world, both militarily and economically. 
Methodology 
This paper will analyze data from the post-Cold War era, that is, from 1990 to 
2011. This is a key period to examine as many countries began their democratization 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, cooperation with the United 
States took place for many different reasons. The United States cooperated more closely 
with those states that were part of the democratic sphere, but also was close to many non-
democratic states to prevent them from moving closer to the Soviet Union. The bipolar 
system drove states towards one of the two poles, though some chose to stay in the 
middle and play both sides as long as they stood to gain. Examining the post-Cold War 
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era makes for a clearer analysis of many of the factors, since the dynamic is a simpler 
one. In the 1990s most analysts saw the international system as a unipolar one, with the 
United States as the single pole. In this case, it would be expected that states would 
gravitate towards the pole in order to improve their lot. With the rise of China since then 
and the growth of the nascent European Union, the United States’ dominance on the 
world stage has weakened. While states may still gravitate on their own towards the U.S., 
states now have greater independence over the path they choose and the relationships 
they enter.  
As a specific starting point for this time frame, 1990 is appropriate, as it is the 
first complete year after the Malta Summit, where Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. 
Bush declared the Cold War to be over. Many states liberalized after that, a process 
which continues to the present day, with another wave of democratic reform coming on 
the heels of the Arab Spring of 2010.  
 This thesis will examine the hypothesis from a quantitative perspective, by 
performing multiple regression. Regression is appropriate here as there are so many 
possible explanations and factors involved leading to cooperation. The use of regression 
will show what effect each of the variables has on the dependent variable and how 
significant those effects are. The dependent variable of this research is the level of 
cooperation with the United States. This will be measured by two types of indicators of 
political and economic cooperation. In this paper, cooperation will be considered as either 
the number of new bilateral treaties with the U.S. or the level of bilateral trade in goods 
with the U.S. Democratization, on the other hand is considered as an incremental increase 
in democracy rating over time. The hypothesis is that the independent variable of 
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democratization will be the factor that correlates to a higher level of cooperation, thought 
alternatives will be examined as well to rule out the possibility that the cooperation has 
other causes. 
Cooperation 
I am confining my study to bilateral agreements, partly for reasons of space, but 
also because bilateral agreements more clearly measure cooperation between two states, 
whereas with multilateral arrangements, there are other states involved, which will make 
it harder to quantify the level of bilateral cooperation. States’ entrance into multilateral 
agreements may be indicative of a favorable stance towards the other countries involved, 
rather than just towards the U.S. Considering only bilateral agreements will control for 
the effect of other states’ presence in the arrangement.  
In addition, although most studies have looked at cooperation in multilateral 
bodies, most notably by looking at voting patterns in the U.N.,1 it is too difficult to 
determine the extent to which similar votes are a product of increased cooperation 
between two states or coincidental due to similar desired outcomes. The motivations for 
having the same preference on an issue can be completely different. With bilateral 
agreements, the situation is simpler. Bilateral treaties are penned on very specific issues 
and their signing and entering into force indicates not just an agreement on those issues, 
but also a desire to formalize that agreement and enter into a cooperative arrangement. 
This indicator of cooperation is measured by looking at the number of new 
treaties that entered in force in a given year. This data comes from the Department of 
                                                
1 Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 
(1983): 315–340. 
  Sterr 
 8 
State publication, Treaties in Force.2 It is a simple list of treaties that are currently in 
force between the U.S. and each country of the world, accompanied by the date each 
treaty went into effect. Only treaties that are in force are listed, so the data excludes some 
treaties that may have been signed but have not yet entered into force. Often they have 
not entered into force, as either the U.S. or the other state has not yet met certain 
conditions that were written into the treaty. It is appropriate to wait until a treaty has 
entered into force, as this will show that both states are serious in enacting the agreement 
they wrote. 
The study considers those bilateral treaties that were in effect over the range of 
years from 1990 to 2008. There are a few problems with relying solely on Treaties in 
Force. The first issue is that some treaties are listed years after having entered into force. 
The second issue is that the treaties are supposed to be indexed according to Texts of 
International Agreements to which the US is a party (TIAS), but this publication, until 
recently, was years behind in indexing the treaties, so in the volumes from the 1990s 
most treaties are listed without an index number, making it difficult to discern one from 
another. To mitigate these issues, Treaties in Force was used in conjunction with two 
other publications, Kavass’s Guide to the United States Treaties in Force3 and the 
Current Treaty Index.4 Both were originally compiled by Igor Kavass and employ a 
numbering system to refer to treaties that have not yet received a TIAS index number. 
                                                
2 U.S. Department of State, “Treaties in Force” (Washington, DC: Office of the Legal Advisor, n.d.). 
3 Igor I. Kavass and Adolf Sprudzs, eds., Kavass’s Guide to the United States Treaties in Force, 1992nd–
2013th ed. (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., Inc, 2013). 
4 Igor I. Kavass and Adolf Sprudzs, eds., Current Treaty Index, 12th-53rd ed. (Buffalo, NY: William S. 
Hein & Co., Inc, 2013). 
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This made it easier to code the treaties. These publications also grouped the treaties by 
general categories like “Economic and Technical Cooperation,” “Finance,” and 
“Defense.” This also helped the coding process, because I was interested in testing my 
hypothesis at the disaggregated level as well as at the aggregate. Those treaties that fell 
under economic issues, including trade, debts, and finance and those that were security 
related, falling under categories like weapons, arms limitations, and defense were 
tabulated by country and by year. Peter Rohn, in World Treaty Index5 groups treaties 
according to five categories: administrative and diplomatic, social cooperation, economic 
cooperation, aid, and military. Since the purpose is to examine political and economic 
cooperation, the other categories were excluded, leaving only economic and security 
based treaties. 
Kavass’s system does not only code the treaties themselves, but also amendments 
to treaties as they are added. From a theoretical perspective, an amendment to a treaty 
requires active cooperation as much as an actual treaty, so amendments were included in 
the count. As this variable is being coded at 3-year intervals, each country was assigned 
three separate values for the economic treaties, the security treaties, and the combined 
total of treaties. To code the data for 1993, for example, the total number of new treaties 
and amendments that had entered into force from 1991 to 1993 were added up. By 
looking both at the different types of treaties and the overall total, it will be possible to 
draw more conclusions as well as observe effects that may have been hidden by simply 
looking at the aggregate total. 
                                                
5 Peter H Rohn, World Treaty Index, 2nd Ed (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984).R 
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Trade is another good indicator of cooperation. A state will be seen as cooperating 
more if its trade with the United States, as a percentage of its overall trade, increases over 
the given period of time. The total trade is the aggregate trade in goods between the 
countries, taking into account flows in both directions. The percentage this comprises of a 
country’s total trade indicates how large of a role the U.S. has as a trading partner. 
The data comes from a variety of sources, as no one source was found that 
covered all of the nations for all of the years of the sample. This data was primarily 
accessible through the U.S. Census Bureau’s foreign trade website. 6 Total trade was 
taken primarily from the World Bank’s World Databank.7 Data for Taiwan came from the 
Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade.8 There were a few gaps in the data, which were filled 
using the Correlates of War National Trade data set. These covered Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine for 1993 as well as Serbia for 1993-2002.9 There are some 
endogeneity concerns here, as strong trade dependence could be the reason for closer 
cooperation with the United States, but these should be neutralized by the 3 year lag in 
variables. Most peaceful cooperation will be captured by the two indicators chosen. 
Democratization 
For the purposes of this paper, what is meant by democratization is an increase in 
the level of domestic political liberalization. Democratic practices are measured in a 
variety of ways by various indices. The most familiar of these are from Freedom House 
                                                
6 U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Trade in Goods by Country,” Foreign Trade, 2014, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/. 
7 The World Bank, “World Databank,” 2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
8 Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade, “Trade Statistics,” 2014, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/. 
9 Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 
2012, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/Trade/Trade.html. 
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and Polity IV. Using only these scores to rate the countries over the desired time period, 
however, could be problematic, as the measures are both based in the United States and 
thus may contain some bias in their rating. Due to this bias, the indices may rank 
countries that the U.S. is more unfriendly with as more undemocratic. In order to reduce 
this bias, it is necessary to consider alternative indices that are based outside of the U.S. 
One such index is the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. The problem, 
however, is that the EIU only has data from 2006, 2008, and 2010. Other indices under 
consideration included the Neuer Index der Demokratie (NID),10 developed by Hans-
Joachim Lauth and V-Dem. In the case of the NID, the issue is the restrictions on the 
availability of data, which runs from 1996 through 2010. V-Dem, an index created by an 
international team of social scientists, promises to have data from 1900 through to the 
present and will also allow visitors to their website to create their own indices based on 
the hundreds of indicators that they have codified.11 The problem is that their data will 
not be available until the fall of 2015, with a limited amount being available in April 
2014. None of these alternative indices alone is appropriate for the purposes of this study. 
As many indices have overlapping ranges in the time periods they cover, a 
slightly different approach is necessary. In order to incorporate multiple indices into the 
analysis, this study uses the Unified Democracy Scores.12 The UDS is an index that 
aggregates the scores of ten democracy indices over the period from 1946 to 2008. The 
                                                
10 Hans-Joachim Lauth, “Kombinierter Index Der Demokratie,” 2013, http://www.politikwissenschaft.uni-
wuerzburg.de/lehrbereiche/vergleichende/forschung/neuer_index_der_demokratie_nid/. 
11 “V-Dem: Varieties of Democracy,” 2013, https://v-dem.net. 
12 D. Pemstein, S. a. Meserve, and J. Melton, “Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten 
Measures of Regime Type,” Political Analysis 18, no. 4 (August 26, 2010): 426–449. 
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indices it includes are from Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Political Regime Change 
(PRC), Polyarchy,13 Arat,14 Bowman et al. (BLM),15 Hadenius,16 Bollen,17 and 
Przeworski et al. (PACL). 1819 The 10 constituent indices all have “similar underlying 
conceptualizations of democracy.”20  
The most familiar of these, Freedom House, uses a question framework to rank 
the countries on a scale from -7 to 7. Some of the questions include “Is there a significant 
opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or 
gain power through elections?” and “Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal 
matters? Are police under direct civilian control?”21 These questions are just a sample of 
the types of questions that Freedom House asks to determine the level of political and 
civil liberties of a given state.  
The Polity IV dataset looks at similar characteristics, though it focuses on 
political liberties. As part of its democracy indicator, it looks at four specific areas: the 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, either through elections or not; how open the 
                                                
13 Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “Measuring Polyarchy,” in On Measuring Democracy: Its 
Consequences and Concomitants, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991), 47–68. 
14 Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1991). 
15 Kirk Bowman, Fabrice Lehoucq, and James Mahoney, “Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, 
Data Adequacy, and Central America,” Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 8 (October 01, 2005): 939–
970. 
16 Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
17 Kenneth A Bollen, “Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy, 1950-1990” (Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) [distributor], 2001). 
18 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-Being in 
the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
19 See Appendix 1 for more information on the constituent measures of the various indices. 
20 D. Pemstein, S. a. Meserve, and J. Melton, “Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten 
Measures of Regime Type,” Political Analysis 18, no. 4 (August 26, 2010): 426–449. p.3 
21 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” Freedom in the World, 2014, 
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology. 
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elections are; the constraints on the power of the chief executive; and the competitiveness 
of political participations. A country is given up to 2, 1, 4, and 3 points respectively in 
those categories. In measuring autocracies, the same indicators are used, but are weighted 
2, 1, 3, and 4 points. For example, in coding a state’s level of autocracy, it is given 2 
points if elections are restricted and 1 if they are sectarian.22 After the coding, states are 
given a democracy score from 0 to 10 as well as an autocracy score from 0 to 10. Finally 
the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score to rate the state on a scale 
from -10 to 10. 
The Vanhanen index relies on a simple coding. Vanhanen looked at the share of 
votes cast for the dominant party and electoral participation.23 The measure is simple. It 
just takes the percentage turnout in the last election and multiplies it by the percentage of 
votes that were not cast for the dominant party (or 100 minus the dominant party 
percentage of votes). Finally the result is divided by 100 to get a score ranging from 0 to 
100. Vanhanen has many critics, due to the simplicity of his model, but he argues that 
“these two variables are good approximate indicators of democracy’s most important 
dimensions.”24  
The PRC index codes countries as democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, or 
transitional. Democracies are defined as regimes in which there is substantial competition 
for positions of power, there is inclusion in the selection of leaders, with no social groups 
                                                
22 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “Dataset Users’ Manual,” Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012, 2013, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf. 
23 Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries (New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
24 Ibid. p.38.  
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being left out and that have a sufficient level of political and civil liberties.25 This index 
was compiled largely qualitatively, as Gasiorowski wrote a narrative summary for each 
of the 97 countries justifying his dates for regime change. 
The Polyarchy dataset,26 developed by Michael Coppedge, looks at four 
categories: free and fair elections, freedom of organization, freedom of expression, and 
availability of alternate sources of information. Examples of indicators in each category 
include whether there was fraud or coercion in elections, whether political parties are 
allowed to exist at all, whether dissent is tolerated publicly or even privately, and to what 
extent the government dominates the various media.27 The resulting score is given on a 
scale from 1 to 9. 
 Of the remaining indices, Arat,28 Bollen29 and Hadenius30 use continuous scales 
for their indices.  Bowman et al. (BLM)31 developed an index that focused on Central 
America. Due to the narrow focus, the scale they developed is quite reliable, as they 
employed area experts to perform a detailed analysis of each political system. As it is a 
more extensive index, much like Freedom House or Polity, Przeworski et al. (PACL)32 
                                                
25 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “An Overview of the Political Regime Change Data Set,” Comparative Political 
Studies 29, no. 4 (1996): 469–83. 
26 Coppedge and Reinicke, “Measuring Polyarchy.” 
27 Michael Coppedge, “The Polyarchy and Contestation Scales for 1985 and 2000,” 2006, 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm. 
28 Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries. 
29 Bollen, “Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy, 1950-1990.” 
30 Hadenius, Democracy and Development. 
31 Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney, “Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy, 
and Central America.” 
32 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-Being in the 
World, 1950–1990. 
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sacrifices some amount of specific knowledge, as it covers both a large number of 
countries as well as a long time period. 
The conceptualizations in all of these indices rely upon the general idea that 
“democracy consists of two attributes— contestation or competition and participation or 
inclusion.”33 In other words, all of the components that make up the composite index 
examine the level of political liberalization of a country. Economic liberalization is not 
considered. A country is considered to be democratizing, if it has improved in these two 
areas, having moved significantly on the spectrum between undemocratic and democratic 
political systems. If the country is starting from the far end of the spectrum, it can still be 
considered to be democratizing relative to its previous position, even though it has not yet 
reached what would be considered a democratic regime. Countries that began as strong 
democracies are excluded from this group, as are countries whose level of democracy has 
remained stagnant or declined over the time period in question. 
This index is interesting, because it takes into account such a wide variety of 
indices, rescales them and then measures their mean as an overall indicator of the level of 
democracy. For further accuracy in regression analysis, a confidence interval for each 
country’s mean is also available. Each country is rated using a continuous variable, which 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the larger positive numbers representing more democratic 
governments. The index estimates each country’s value by finding the mean and median 
scores of the various indicators, along with the standard deviation and degree of 
confidence. By combining the indices in this manner, Pemstein, et al. were able to 
                                                
33 Gerald L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating 
Alternative Indices,” Comparative Political Studies 35Ibid., no. 1 (February 01, 2002): 5–34. p.9 
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incorporate indices with overlapping ranges of years, as the aggregate scores are not 
affected greatly by the inclusion or exclusion of a particular index in a particular year. 
Adding another index for a given year should create a uniform effect over the entire 
sample. While this index does not cover the entire range of years intended, it is still 
suitable as a 3 year lag means that data is only needed from 1990 to 2008. 
Alternative Explanations 
Democratization is not the only reason why a state might increase its cooperation 
with the U.S. It is possible that there are other factors that influence the level of 
cooperation with the U.S. The alternative explanations that will be considered are the 
level of military presence the U.S. has in the country, the amount of military aid given to 
the country, the amount of economic aid given the country, and the per capita GDP of the 
country. 
The first alternative explanation is that this cooperation is related to either a 
military alliance or occupation. In one study, Tim Kane found that there was a positive 
correlation between U.S. troop deployment and an increase in development indicators.34 
The increase in the standard of living as a result of the troop deployment could, in turn, 
be the cause of increased trade or more cooperation. It is also possible that a U.S. military 
presence has a coercive effect on the country, influencing its leaders to cooperate more 
readily with the U.S. In the case of either a military alliance or occupation, the state 
involved may be compelled to cooperate in other areas due to the considerable influence 
the U.S. wields with its military force. The occupation of post-war Germany and Japan is 
                                                
34 Tim Kane, “Development and US Troop Deployments,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 3 (July 28, 
2012): 255–273. 
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one such case where the level of cooperation was related to a continuing U.S. military 
presence in the country.35 On the other hand, the strategic position of a country may lead 
the U.S. to make many concessions and bring it closer to the state, rather than vice versa. 
The relations between Djibouti and the U.S., for example, have been influenced by the 
arrangement for the U.S. to house its Africa Command at Camp Lemonnier. In another 
case, the influence of the military could have had a major influence, for example, on the 
number of bilateral agreements signed between the U.S. and Afghanistan. This variable 
will be coded continuously, indicating the number of troops present in the country. Many 
countries have fewer than 1,000 troops. In 2005, for example, only 14 states fit had more 
than this amount. The study will use the dataset developed by Tim Kane for the coding of 
this variable,36 which details the number of U.S. troops deployed in each country 
worldwide from 1950 to 2005. For the years after this, data is taken from the Department 
of Defense human resources site, DMDC.37  
It is not necessary for the U.S. to have troops on the ground to influence the 
foreign policy of a state. Dependence on the United States for security matters could also 
explain a willingness to cooperate in other areas. In order to quantify this variable, the 
amount of aid the U.S. gives a state, as a percentage of the state’s GDP, be used as an 
indicator to account for the relative influence of military aid. The data for the amount of 
                                                
35 Nicolas Bouchet, “The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency,” 
International Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 31–51. 
36 Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003, Center for Data Analysis Report 04-11, 2004, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003. 
37 U.S. Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/Country,” Military 
Personnel, 2013, 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=milActDutReg. 
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aid is taken from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) website.38 
The data for GDP was largely taken from the UN Statistics Division.39 As the UN does 
not keep data on Taiwan, data for Taiwan was taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook data set.40 In addition, data for Djibouti, Estonia, and 
Serbia was taken from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research 
Service.41 
Economic aid may also be a factor leading to increased cooperation. Jeanne Hey 
cites aid as one of the most prominent channels of dependence.42 This variable will also 
be measured using USAID data from the same source and will be considered as a 
percentage of the state’s GDP. During the Cold War, many countries, including many 
non-democracies, received substantial aid in return for their cooperation on East vs. West 
issues. In theory, they were working with the U.S. to combat the spread of communism, 
though in hindsight it has been found that many leaders used the aid to boost their 
personal accounts. No matter what their motivation, there was some cooperation as a 
result of this aid. By including this variable, we can test whether or not similar situations 
continue to prevail after the end of the Cold War. 
                                                
38 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data,” U.S. Overseas Loans 
and Grants, 2011, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html. 
39 U.N. Statistics Division, “National Accounts Main Aggregates Database,” 2013, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp. 
40 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook,” 2014, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
41 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “International Macroeconomic Data Set,” 2013, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-macroeconomic-data-set.aspx#.U22iua1dV7x. 
42 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Foreign Policy Options under Dependence: A Theoretical Evaluation with Evidence 
from Ecuador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 25, no. 3 (1993): 543–574. p.544 
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Finally, the wealthier the country, the more it may need markets for its goods. It is 
possible that countries are more likely to cooperate simply because they have become 
wealthier and not necessarily because they have democratized. Bruce Russett writes that 
“good theory suggests that rich countries are unlikely to fight each other, as are countries 
whose economies are growing rapidly…”43 As a measure of wealth, per capita GDP will 
be considered. As with economic and military aid, it is not enough to consider total GDP, 
as a country’s GDP could be increasing, but increasing more slowly than its population. 
In this case, the country is actually becoming less wealthy. The source for the data used is 
the UN Statistics Division, with the exception of Taiwan, which is not listed.44 Data for 
Taiwan was again used from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.45 Both per capita GDP 
and economic interdependence were factors that Remmer found to explain an increase in 
some forms of cooperation.46 One hypothesis that scholars have made is that there is a 
link between economic wealth and democracy.47 Some examples, such as Saudi Arabia, 
defy this hypothesis. Perhaps, however, economic wealth does affect levels of 
cooperation. Saudi Arabia, after all, is a key strategic ally of the U.S. despite not having a 
liberal government. By controlling for other possible explanatory factors, the impact of 
the main explanatory variable will be made clearer. 
                                                
43 Bruce Russett et al., “The Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 164–184. p.172 
44 U.N. Statistics Division, “National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.” 
45 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook.” 
46 Karen L. Remmer, “Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation  ? Lessons from the Mercosur 
Region,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1998): 25–51. 
47 Lars Berger, “The Missing Link? US Policy and the International Dimensions of Failed Democratic 
Transitions in the Arab World,” Political Studies 59, no. 1 (March 05, 2011): 38–55. 
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Lag in Variables 
In order to control for endogeneity, that is, the possibility that more cooperation 
has actually led to democratization rather than the converse, the study will use a 3-year 
lag between the measures of the explanatory and dependent variables. This will help to 
clarify the causal direction, which has been noted as an issue when researching 
cooperation and democratization.48 As many countries have 4 or 5-year terms for their 
executives and parliamentarians, 3 years is an appropriate length of time, because, on 
average, it will allow for sufficient time to pass before the democratization measures can 
be seen to have an impact on the state’s foreign policy. It will also allow time for new 
agreements that have been signed to enter into force. Because of the lag, the study will 
correlate the explanatory variables in the years 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 
2008 with the dependent variables measured 3 years afterwards from 1993 through 2011. 
Case Selection 
The cases were selected on the basis of each country’s Unified Democracy Score 
(UDS). First all scores for all countries of the world were examined for the years from 
1990 to 2008. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show worldwide UDS scores in 1990 and 2008 
and exhibit a general worldwide trend of democratization.  For the purposes of this study, 
only countries that were democratizing are considered, excluding those that maintained 
their democracy level or experienced a decrease. During the selection process, countries 
that had ceased to exist in the first few years (e.g. Czechoslovakia, South Yemen) or that 
had become new nations towards the end of the time period (e.g. East Timor, 
                                                
48 Yury V. Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: Why the Impact of US Assistance 
Has Been Below Expectations,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (June 18, 2012): 405–412. 
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Montenegro) were excluded. This left 190 countries, from which 36 were removed, as 
they had UDS scores above 1.0, which meant they were substantially democratic. From 
here, the slope of the line was calculated for each country.  
 
Figure 2.1: Unified Democracy Scores 1990 
Source: Original work using data from Unified Democracy Scores 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Unified Democracy Scores 2008 
Source: Original work using data from Unified Democracy Scores 
 
This helped to show both the general trend in the countries’ scores over time, which led 
to the removal of 32 countries whose slopes were negative. The global mean UDS score 
went from 0.068 in 1990 to 0.424 in 2008 with a slope of 0.016. To get countries which 
had exceeded the average change, only those countries with a slope greater than 0.02 
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were selected, excluding an additional 58 countries with small positive slopes over the 
time period. As the goal was to identify countries that had democratized at a steady pace, 
the Pearson 𝑅 values were calculated to see how well they fit their lines of best fit. 
Countries with 𝑅 > 0.6 were selected, as their growth was more closely linear over the 
time period and were less likely to have erratic changes. This left 36 countries, from 
which an additional five were removed as they had experienced a significant decline in 
democracy at some point during the time period. In the end, 31 countries were included 
in the final selection. These countries were varied geographically. As can be seen above 
in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, two of the main areas of noticeable change in democracy 
scores are Eastern Europe and the continent of Africa. As such, it is fitting that the 
selected countries included ten countries from the Eastern Bloc: Croatia, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine, as well as ten African 
countries: Cape Verde, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Uganda. The 31 countries and a trend line for their  
democracy scores are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Source: Unified Democracy Scores 
Useful Literature 
 In international relations, there are different theories of cooperation. The realist 
approach differs greatly from that of liberal theorists, and constructivism offers a third 
explanation of cooperation.  
Realism 
The realist believes that cooperation is always done with power considerations in 
mind and usually takes the form of military alliances. For example, international politics 
in the 19th century were concerned with balancing power in Europe after the fall of 
Napoleon. The shifting alliances resulted in the Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente, 
which set the stage for the power struggle of World War I. Such alliances were formed to 
increase the power of the individual states, which resulted in opposing alliances being 
formed to balance the first. The struggle for power leads some states to enter into 
alliances for convenience sake and to switch sides whenever they feel it will be to their 
benefit. It is this behavior that realists feel undermines international cooperation. The 
realist takes as fact that allies cannot truly be trusted, because the interstate system is one 
of anarchy. Therefore, as other states’ intentions are unknown, the best a state can do is to 
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building up military forces, for example, will lead other states to be suspicious and to 
follow suit. First and foremost, states are always looking out for their own security rather 
than that of the alliance. Rousseau’s metaphor of the stag hunt exemplifies the realist 
view. Realists focus on the tendency of one member of the party to break off to pursue 
the hare, the lesser good, rather than staying with the party where there is a chance to 
capture and share the stag. Because of this tendency, cooperation between states is 
always problematic. An independently powerful state would therefore see that 
cooperation is not in its best interest. During the Cold War, these same power politics 
were characteristic of the bipolar system. Smaller, less powerful states would pander to 
one of the two super powers in order to receive whatever benefits they could, in the form 
of aid, military assistance, or political support. The post-Cold War era lacks the two poles 
of power, so that states cannot play the game in the same manner. While it is still in their 
interest to build relations with the United States as the major superpower, the United 
States does not have as much motivation to respond in kind, as it is no longer trying to 
balance the power of its sphere of influence against that of the Eastern Bloc. The roles of 
states are not as clearly defined and it is uncertain against whom the United States needs 
to balance its power. China may be a candidate in the future, but has not yet reached the 
point of posing a threat to the military power of the United States. Regardless, the United 
States has to be proactive in seeking economic allies. 
Liberalism 
As opposed to realists, liberal theorists strongly believe that states can cooperate 
for absolute. This is particularly true of neo-liberal theory. As opposed to the early 
idealist liberal theory of the late 19th and early 20th century, neo-liberal theory is more 
pragmatic and focuses on the role of institutions. It has especially found a strong 
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following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, an event that was 
unanticipated and not explained by realist theories. Liberals have faith in institutions and 
believe that they have a role in keeping peace and preventing conflict. Cooperation can, 
in this way, lead to absolute gains for the parties involved. 
Liberal ideas brought the League of Nations into being after World War I, an 
idealist attempt to prevent war through international cooperation. Unfortunately, this 
experiment in international cooperation failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II, as 
there were serious shortcomings in the structure of the organization and states were wary 
of taking harsh measures towards Hitler, as they did not want another war. For realists, 
this was expected, as the League was not a military alliance and therefore lacked the real 
power to enforce peace. Liberal ideas were not so quick to die, however, and even before 
World War II was over, the United Nations was being formed, learning from the past 
lessons of the failed League. While far from perfect, the United Nations and its related 
bodies are the exemplar of international cooperation in the modern era. The UN and the 
organizations under its umbrella make up a substantial portion of all inter-state 
organizations.  
These organizations are examples of neo-liberal institutions, meant to drive 
cooperation between states, which in turn should prevent conflict. The underlying motive 
for promoting peace is to allow states to grow economically and flourish, uninterrupted 
by conflict. In terms of what factors influence whether or not states will cooperate, liberal 
theorists have a few different ideas. According to Moravcsik, liberals see preferences as 
the key to determining the nature of cooperation.  “Drawing on a liberal 
tradition…ideational liberalism views the configuration of domestic social identities and 
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values as a basic determinant of state preferences, and, therefore, of interstate conflict and 
cooperation.”49 By this approach, if two states were to have similar interests and values, it 
should follow that their preferences will be similar, which should lead to less conflict and 
more cooperation. The patterns of preferences, according to Moravcsik, will determine 
the “form, substance, and depth of cooperation.”50 While liberals do allow for the role of 
military force, it is a limited role. Instead, they believe that international institutions will 
play a more important role and will thus be key instruments for state policy.51   
Constructivism 
 Constructivist scholars make up another branch of the international relations field. 
Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not take identities and interests as givens. 
Constructivism can be seen as an alternative to both liberalism and realism, though 
sometimes it is considered more as a bridge between the two and certainly it shares with 
liberalism a focus on norms and values. According to the constructivist view, 
international relations are always a work in progress and thus are constantly in a state of 
change. It is a more interpretive way of looking at international relations. The 
constructivist world is one that is focused more around agency than structure, where 
norms and values play a large role in dictating the relationships between states. It is a 
very subjective approach, as attitudes and actions will be greatly influenced by different 
sets of values. 
                                                
49 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously  : A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553. p.525. 
50 Ibid. p.521. 
51 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Realism and Complex Interdependence,” in International 
Relations Theory, ed. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 307–318. 
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 As far as cooperation is concerned, constructivists believe that states are more 
likely to cooperate because they share the same values and identities and adhere to the 
same norms. Finnemore defines norms as shared moral assessments among a group of 
states, ranging in size from a small regional group to a global group of states.52 If a group 
of states shares the same norms, they would be expected to be more likely to cooperate. If 
two states have both internalized democratic norms, one would expect the two states to 
enter into more cooperative arrangements. In this sense, the United States can be seen as 
what Finnemore calls a “norm entrepreneur” seeking to encourage other states to adopt 
democratic norms. While these norms are held as values that are inherently right, the 
decision to spread them also is based on a sense of utility. That is, the United States will 
benefit from relationships with states with similar norms, and therefore it is in the interest 
of the U.S. to spread norms around the globe. According to Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 
constructivism is actually complementary to neoliberal institutionalism.53 She proposes 
that constructivism helps to explain the implicit assumption in liberalism that identities 
must be transformed in order to maintain cooperation. The difference between the two, 
however, in their approach to cooperation, is that liberalism is concerned with behavioral 
cooperation, while constructivism looks into the development of an international 
community and collective identities.54 Constructivists further believe that through 
interaction, states’ interests can actually be shaped and can be changed. In the liberal 
                                                
52 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. p.892. 
53 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2000): 97–119. 
54 Ibid. p.100. 
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approach, state interests are fixed and are only considered as having an effect on the 
interaction, but not as being affected by it. In situations where states realize that 
cooperation is beneficial, however, they do make the necessary changes to ensure that the 
cooperation will continue. 
Democratic Peace 
As a sub-theory of liberal theory, democratic peace theory helps to explain why 
states do not go to war. This theory, based on Immanuel Kant’s work and popularized by 
Michael Doyle and others, proposes that democratic states do not go to war with one 
another. Though some scholars criticize the theory for its carefully chosen definitions of 
democracy and war, it is almost universally accepted that the occurrence of war between 
democracies is a rare event. Bruce Russett recognizes that, statistically, democracies 
seldom go to war, but he argues that throughout history there have been few democracies 
and few wars and therefore it would hold that there are very few wars between 
democracies. He argues that this finding alone is not statistically significant, because it is 
expected if one relies on statistical probabilities.55 For example, the liberal approach to 
international relations relies on state preferences and those do depend on regime type. 
Democratic states are characterized by liberal systems based on the rule of the people. 
“Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their 
foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect.”56 Because of this lack 
of trust, democratic countries still consider war as an option when dealing with non-
democracies, as non-democracies do not first and foremost look to the interests of their 
                                                
55 Russett et al., “The Democratic Peace.” p.165. 
56 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 
(1986): 1151–1169. p.1161. 
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citizens.57 Liberal states, on the other hand, have a more cosmopolitan view, relying on a 
firm belief that all people should be free, no matter which state they call home.58 While 
characterized as a liberal theory, the democratic peace theory also makes sense when 
looked at from a constructivist perspective. Having similar norms, democratic states 
should be more likely to cooperate and solve their problems diplomatically rather than 
resorting to war, as they would with a non-democratic state. Christopher Layne writes 
that “democratic peace theory relies on two asserted causal explanations: (a) institutional 
constraints and (b) democratic norms and culture.”59 With respect to institutional 
constraints, liberals mean that democracies, because their leaders are elected and 
accountable to their constituents, are less likely to go to war. Furthermore, there can exist 
other constraints such as strict legislation hindering the declaration of war. In the U.S., 
for example, Congress is the body with the power to pass an actual declaration of war, 
thereby subjecting such decisions to a debate by a large representative body of elected 
officials, each of whom is concerned with staying in office. Democratic countries are also 
seen generally as being more likely to trade with each other, as a liberal political system 
is generally associated with a liberal economy. According to this theory, democratization 
would be the best option for an autocratic government to minimize conflict and improve 
the economy simultaneously. 
                                                
57 John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 
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58 Ibid. p.94. 
59 Russett et al., “The Democratic Peace.” p.175. 
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Cooperation and Democratization 
In general terms, Huntington identifies three major waves of democratization in 
the modern world. The first wave ran from the early 18th century through to the end of 
World War I. The second wave began right after World War II, but was short-lived, 
petering out in the early 1960s. Huntington’s third wave began in the late 1970s and 
continued at least through the 1980s.60 Many scholars consider the third wave to be 
continuing, though some scholars have separated out a fourth wave characterized by the 
democratization of post-communist countries after 1989.61 Regardless of how the period 
is denoted, the post-Cold War era is a significant period of democratization and is the 
focus of this study.  
 There are many different reasons why countries have democratized, which have 
varied across the waves. The first wave was largely characterized by a transition from 
monarchies to democracy. In the second wave, democratization came largely from the 
outside as this wave consisted of liberation and decolonization. The third wave, however, 
was different, with the efforts largely being indigenous.62 More recently, however, there 
have been significant efforts made to bring about regime change in a more forceful 
manner, exemplified by the U.S. invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
NATO support of the popular movement in Libya, and also by structural readjustment 
plans that were designed to liberalize economies of developing countries. In many cases 
during the third wave, autocratic rulers themselves decided to transition their countries to 
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democracy. In some cases, this was due to political or international pressure, such as the 
anti-Apartheid movement and its influence on South Africa’s transition to majority rule. 
At other times, the leaders chose to start the transition process, such as General Franco in 
Spain. Often the transition has been a gradual one, with countries first introducing 
multiparty elections, which, over time, can lead to the ruling party transitioning power to 
an opposition party. In some countries, like Tanzania, efforts towards political 
liberalization have not yet led to a change in the ruling party. There the ruling Chama cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution) maintains the control it has had since 
independence, though it is now secured through the ballot box in multiparty elections that 
are judged to be free and fair. 
 A number of scholars have researched the link between international cooperation 
and democratization. Contemporary scholars have interpreted Kant’s tripod for perpetual 
peace to stand upon the three legs of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations.63 Russett et al. found that each of these three legs contributes to a 
reduction in conflict. The question is whether they will also lead to increased 
cooperation. Some have found that the right international organizations have the ability to 
effectively promote democracy among their members.64 In this respect, participation in 
such organizations can influence domestic democratization. Some scholars, including 
Yury Bosin, point out that it is difficult to identify the causal direction. Are democratic 
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countries more likely to cooperate or are those states that cooperate more likely to 
become democratic?65  
In terms of links that have been found between democracy and cooperation, a 
study of the Mercosur countries done by Karen Remmer found democratic dyads to be 
associated with an increased number of economic agreements, compared to other dyads. 
This increase, she argued, could also be explained by other factors such as joint GDP and 
trade interdependence.66 This study helped to guide the consideration of the alternative 
explanations explored in this study. While the focus of this thesis is not solely economic 
agreements, it is narrowing a portion of Remmer’s work both in terms of geographic area 
as well as in the type of cooperation observed between states. 
What kind of cooperation can be expected from democratizing states? According 
to Mansfield and Pevehouse, not just democracies, but also democratizing countries join 
international organizations more frequently.67 Mansfield and Pevehouse’s research also 
shows that joining such organizations can help reduce the possibility of regression from a 
democratic system back to a more authoritarian one. International organizations seem to 
indeed be an important part of ensuring the longevity of democracies, in accordance with 
the Kant’s tripod. 
Democracies are also likely to cooperate in security areas. Multilateral institutions 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are made up of liberal states that are 
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looking to secure their territory. Originally comprised of the U.S., Canada, and the 
countries of western Europe, NATO is centered around the idea of mutual self defense, 
that an attack on any of the members should be seen as an attack on all of them.   In 
addition to improving security, democracies also cooperate in other areas. John Ikenberry 
outlines a number of the benefits of relations between democracies.68 Among these, he 
notes that “Democracies are also more open and accessible to the direct representations 
of other states, allowing potential partners to not just make agreements, but also to create 
a political process that allows them to actually influence policy in the other 
democracies.”69 Democracy-democracy relations are desirable, motivating countries to 
democratize so they too can enjoy the amenities of such relations. 
Dependence and Cooperation 
 Dependence theory views the world as consisting of a core and periphery. In this 
view, the core, made up of highly industrialized modern economies, looks to the 
periphery for resources. The relationship between the two sectors is an exploitative one, 
with the core further strengthening its position and the periphery ever being weakened. 
Despite this, the periphery has no option but to trade with the core, as the economies of 
the individual states are not strong enough for them to trade with other peripheral states. 
Thus, their economies are subject to the whims of the core states and depend upon the 
actions of those states.  
                                                
68 John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post‐
War Era,” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, John 
Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–32. 
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This view has been taken up in some of the foreign policy literature on 
dependence. One model that has been proposed is the bargaining model. Under the 
bargaining model, a powerful state like the U.S. gives aid, economic or military, in 
exchange for diplomatic support, such as votes in international organizations like the 
U.N. According to another view, however, the foreign policy of weak states conforms to 
the preferences of dominant states.70 There is evidence that, in some cases, states will not 
follow this model and will instead react against being dependent. Jeanne Hey describes 
varying situations where dependent states can put forward an anti-core foreign policy in 
order to appease domestic critics of the dependent relationship.71 In Jamaica, Michael 
Manley was frustrated with the dependent relationship and thus adopted a 
counterdependent foreign policy in an effort to weaken the dependent relationship.72 An 
alternative to the bargaining model that also can explain why there is a resemblance 
between the foreign policies of strong and weak states is the idea of consensus. It is 
possible, according to the consensus view, that weak states have the same foreign policy 
as dominant states and would have had those positions regardless of the position of the 
dominant states. The similarity in their choices, therefore, is simply because they agree 
on the issues, as opposed to the idea that they have transformed their foreign policy to 
conform to that of the dominant states. Moon attributes these similar views to the foreign 
education of many leaders as well as the increasing ties with the core through the 
                                                
70 Moon, “Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence.” p.297. 
71 Hey, “Foreign Policy Options under Dependence: A Theoretical Evaluation with Evidence from 
Ecuador.” p.549. 
72 William Jesse Biddle and John D Stephens, “Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Jamaica,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 411–434. p.419. 
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availability of information,73 a trend that has continued and plays even more of a role in 
the post-Cold War world. These situations show the variety of reactions states can have 
to being dependent. It is not universally true that they conform to the will of the dominant 
states. 
Some Literature on Cooperation with the United States 
Dependence theorists have found that states that are closely linked to the U.S. 
have actually had very similar U.N. voting patterns.74 Bruce Moon found that there are 
instances when the U.S. distributed aid, not out of sheer generosity, nor as a bargaining 
chip to gain support, but—for example, the case of debt-relief—to prevent problems in 
the American banking system. Therefore, such actions were actually in the interest of the 
U.S. regardless of the cooperation it received from the receiving states.75 
 Does the regime of a weaker state affect the amount of aid and the nature of 
cooperation it will have with the U.S.? Lai and Morey found that “cooperation is not just 
about preference similarity or inducements; rather, a state’s domestic political institutions 
play an important role.”76 Interestingly, they actually found that nondemocratic leaders 
were more likely to vote with the U.S. after the receipt of increased military and 
economic aid when compared to democratic leaders. This finding shows that 
nondemocratic leaders are more susceptible to bargaining than democratic leaders.  
                                                
73 Moon, “Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence.” p.308. 
74 Ibid. p.298. 
75 Ibid. p.301. 
76 Brian Lai and Daniel S. Morey, “Impact of Regime Type on the Influence of U.S. Foreign Aid,” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 2, no. 4 (2006): 385–404. p.402. 
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Promotion of Democracy in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Democracy promotion has been a key component of U.S. foreign policy.77 The 
brand of democracy that the U.S. promotes is a liberal democracy combined with a free 
market economy. The justification for this approach relies on the belief that democratic 
regimes will both be peaceful as well as increase their cooperation with the United States 
in security and economics. Nations promote democracy because there are benefits to 
working with other democracies and the commonality of having a democratic system can 
lead to greater understanding in political relations. In addition to the prospect of 
cooperation, democratic states also promote democracy, because democracies tend to 
perform better economically as well as in relation to human rights.78 In the U.S., aid for 
democracy has been channeled through the Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy, which gives Congressional funds 
to the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI). The U.S. has been especially active in democracy promotion since the end of the 
Cold War, a goal that many presidents have pursued. President Bill Clinton, for example, 
included this in his 1994 State of the Union message the following statement: “ultimately 
the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the 
advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other; they make 
better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”79 Presidents George W. Bush and 
                                                
77 Jeff Bridoux and Malcolm Russell, “Liberal Democracy Promotion in Iraq: A Model for the Middle East 
and North Africa?,” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 3 (July 03, 2013): 327–346. 
78 James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to 
the Developing World, 1988-20011,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 1 (March 07, 2011): 47–69. 
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Barack Obama have both continued to rely on this as a major aspect of their foreign 
policy.80 Bouchet notes that, “For the Obama administration as for its predecessors, 
America’s security, prosperity and predominant international status are all viewed as 
going hand in hand with democratization abroad…”81  
There is considerable debate about how effective this promotion of democracy 
has been. Peter Burnell, in his paper appraising democracy promotion, notes just how 
difficult it is to analyze this, due to the number of variables involved82 The U.S. has 
promoted democracy in many different regions, with the focus shifting over time. Yuri 
Bosin’s study, for example, focuses on U.S. aid for the promotion of democracy in 
former Soviet states. 83  In the 21st century, the U.S. policy of democracy promotion is 
most evident in the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq turned into an effort at establishing 
a liberal democracy, a task that met serious challenges due to the lack of civil society 
institutions in Iraq. More recently, democracy promotion has played a significant role in 
the U.S. involvement in the Arab Spring. These efforts differ greatly from those in Iraq. 
In Iraq, the United States intervened militarily to force a change in regime with the 
intention of creating democracy from the top down. During the Arab Spring, by contrast, 
the focus on democracy promotion has been on building up institutions of civil society. 
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These organizations are necessary to support any changes that are being made in the 
regime.  
The task of promotion has not been an easy one, as less democratic regimes may 
crack down on the activities of democracy promoters. During the Arab Spring, for 
example, the Egyptian military cracked down on the activities of the IRI and NDI84 in an 
effort to suppress the people’s movement. Despite setbacks such as this, the U.S. 
continues to maintain its policy of promoting democracy.85  
This study examines the link between democratization and cooperation. It is 
different from other studies in a number of ways. Rather than examining the overall level 
of cooperation or cooperation in multilateral settings, I look specifically at the 
cooperation of a country with the U.S. It therefore avoid forms of participation that could 
be influenced by third party states, while incidentally trying to assess how successful the 
U.S. has been in attracting other countries to its values in the post-Cold War era.  
In the next section, I will examine the preliminary data that was collected before 
performing regression analysis to see how the various factors are related to the level of 
cooperation.
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Data and Findings 
In order to test the hypothesis, I applied a linear regression model to determine 
whether any of the possible explanations discussed. This model was first designed as 
a multiple linear regression model treating the data as pooled cross-sectional data. In 
this way, the regression did not take into consideration that a number of observations 
were all from the same nation over time, but rather  
Explanatory Variables 
Figure 3.1 compares the average democracy scores for my selected cases with 
the global average. It shows a large difference in the average level of democratization 
between the selected cases and the average score. The average for the selected cases 
started much lower than the global average and ended up higher than the global 
average, changing by 1.028 points, while global averages only increased by 0.356 
points over the 18-year period. Democracy scores by country are shown in Table 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Average Democratization Levels 
Source: Original work using data from Unified Democracy Scores 
 
 In terms of the independent variables, Table 3.2 shows the number of troops 
present in the selected cases. Most countries had 10 or fewer troops stationed 
throughout the time period, presumably Marines attached to guard the embassies in 
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Table 3.1: Democracy Scores for Selected Countries 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Albania -0.592 0.324 0.222 0.209 0.551 0.755 0.760 
Bahamas 0.588 0.831 0.833 1.052 1.052 1.051 1.177 
Bahrain -1.245 -1.131 -1.239 -1.234 -0.672 -0.675 -0.671 
Cape Verde -0.054 0.713 0.709 0.711 0.714 0.912 1.046 
Chile 0.666 0.674 0.673 0.656 0.751 0.824 1.177 
Croatia  0.174 0.143 0.218 0.807 0.822 0.886 
D. R. Congo -1.014 -0.617 -0.620 -0.600 -0.509 -0.405 -0.176 
Djibouti -0.913 -0.869 -0.626 -0.304 -0.239 -0.302 -0.300 
Estonia  0.604 0.729 0.747 0.910 1.040 1.115 
Georgia  0.018 0.109 0.089 0.045 0.371 0.350 
Ghana -0.784 -0.011 0.196 0.265 0.490 0.758 0.756 
Indonesia -0.777 -0.977 -0.878 0.289 0.277 0.728 0.735 
Kenya -0.877 -0.208 -0.304 -0.090 0.337 0.427 0.377 
Latvia  0.707 0.828 0.891 0.891 1.020 0.892 
Mexico -0.003 0.042 0.196 0.244 0.801 0.793 0.672 
Moldova  0.101 0.351 0.550 0.440 0.564 0.514 
Palau   0.980 0.978 0.978 1.576 1.555 
Panama 0.359 0.363 0.864 0.996 0.994 0.997 0.972 
Poland 0.320 0.706 0.987 0.914 1.096 1.288 1.287 
Rwanda -0.875 -0.782 -0.823 -0.819 -0.639 -0.367 -0.371 
Senegal -0.100 -0.105 -0.069 -0.150 0.478 0.477 0.480 
Serbia -0.481 -0.416 -0.492 -0.390 0.603 0.609 0.688 
Seychelles -0.869 0.034 0.094 0.025 0.258 0.258 0.322 
Sierra Leone -0.776 -0.979 -0.008 0.013 0.249 0.297 0.424 
Slovakia  0.429 0.510 1.061 1.062 1.110 1.287 
Suriname -0.048 0.505 0.602 0.603 0.933 0.798 0.796 
Syria -1.453 -1.453 -1.459 -1.454 -1.142 -0.825 -0.718 
Taiwan -0.064 0.089 0.768 0.825 0.971 1.402 1.168 
Uganda -0.777 -0.586 -0.289 -0.321 -0.259 -0.135 -0.133 
Ukraine  0.298 0.477 0.556 0.521 0.686 0.735 
Vietnam -1.144 -1.140 -1.137 -1.144 -0.720 -0.638 -0.638 
Average -0.475 -0.089 0.075 0.174 0.388 0.523 0.554 
Global Average 0.068 0.216 0.277 0.292 0.347 0.410 0.424 
Source:  Pemstein, et al., Democratic Compromise. 
 
There were two countries which had no troops deployed throughout the entire period: 
Cape Verde and Taiwan. Just five countries averaged between 20 and 50 troops: 
Bahamas, Chile, Indonesia, Kenya and Moldova. Beyond this level, only five 
countries had significant troop presence of more than 100 troops. The five countries 
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have had significant troop presences for a variety of reasons. Bahrain, for example, is 
home to a naval base. 
Table 3.2: U.S. Troops Deployed in Selected Countries 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Albania 0 0 3 1 3 9 10 
Bahamas 36 25 53 23 22 41 41 
Bahrain 682 379 598 1,511 1,560 1,641 1,545 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 20 23 24 30 28 29 35 
Croatia 0 10 4,007 145 0 0 13 
D. R. Congo 10 7 9 6 0 7 8 
Djibouti 11 9 7 2 2 622 1,780 
Estonia 0 0 2 1 8 5 8 
Georgia 0 0 2 5 7 42 18 
Ghana 7 6 7 9 5 14 13 
Indonesia 32 49 43 50 28 23 26 
Kenya 31 33 29 95 43 32 50 
Latvia 0 0 1 0 0 7 6 
Mexico 76 30 35 33 31 30 28 
Moldova 0 0 1 5 0 1 7 
Palau 13 13 29 0 0 0 0 
Panama 11,042 10,542 6,435 19 0 12 16 
Poland 19 18 20 19 19 21 32 
Rwanda 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 
Senegal 12 11 11 7 8 42 7 
Serbia 0 0 8 6,410 2,804 1,801 1,237 
Seychelles 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 7 6 6 0 1 1 3 
Slovakia 0 0 4 0 0 9 10 
Suriname 8 9 2 2 1 3 0 
Syria 12 10 11 9 9 8 9 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 8 6 9 6 7 11 9 
Ukraine 0 0 8 18 13 11 12 
Vietnam 0 2 6 11 15 13 14 
Total 12,030 11,191 11,371 8,417 4,614 4,436 4,943 
Sources: 
1990-2005: Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003.  
2008: U.S. Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by 
Region/Country.” 
 
The U.S. stationed a large number of troops in Croatia in 1996 as part of the one-year 
NATO force stabilizing the region following the December 1995 Dayton peace 
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settlement. The U.S. opened a new base in Djibouti in 2003, which has since been 
expanded. The forces in Panama had been there since the 1989 invasion that deposed 
Manuel Noriega. Finally, the forces in Serbia were part of the NATO forces 
intervening to stop the war in Kosovo. Generally, as can be seen in the total, there 
have progressively fewer troops stationed in the selected countries, though this can 
largely be attributed to the two cases of Panama and Serbia, where troops have been 
steadily. On the surface it appears as though there is not enough significant change 
within country cases to affect levels of cooperation, with few exceptions. Regression 
will have to be used to determine if there is a correlation across nations. 
 The next possible factor to examine is GDP per capita. The data for this are 
shown in Table 3.3. In this case, it is clear that the majority of countries had 
significant increases in GDP over the time period. Global per capita GDP, by 
comparison, increased from about $4,216 to $9,162.87 The selected countries fall short 
of that, but the highly developed countries skew the global per capita GDP figures. Of 
the selected countries, Vietnam boasts the highest proportional increase, increasing to 
twelve times the 1990 figure. There are eight countries whose per capita GDP 
increased by a factor of 4 or more: Albania, Croatia, Chile, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Vietnam. Just the Democratic Republic of Congo ended the time period 
with a lower per capita GDP. Its nominal GDP started at $9.35 billion, but dipped as 
low as $4.71 billion in 1999, before rising to $11.68 billion. Despite the increase in 
GDP over the time period, its population growth outstripped it as it went from 34.9 
                                                
87 The World Bank, “World Databank.” 
International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook.” 
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million in 1990 to 58.8 million in 2008, causing an overall decrease in per capita 
GDP. Generally, this variable is increasing for most countries over the time period, 
similar to their democracy scores.   
Table 3.3: GDP per capita of Selected Countries (in Historical USD) 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Albania 645 516 992 1,032 1,361 2,553 4,113 
Bahamas 14,436 13,331 16,040 20,515 22,515 23,417 23,674 
Bahrain 9,900 11,102 12,173 11,831 13,096 18,156 23,038 
Cape Verde 995 1,085 1,405 1,563 1,538 2,309 3,692 
Chile 2,609 3,623 5,318 4,921 4,376 7,532 10,672 
Croatia 3,411 2,688 5,023 5,115 5,993 10,213 15,960 
D. R. Congo 268 273 134 121 112 133 198 
Djibouti 775 751 735 753 801 912 1,213 
Estonia 3,545 2,755 3,336 4,152 5,435 10,492 18,162 
Georgia 1,544 537 614 583 735 1,433 2,900 
Ghana 682 601 647 673 499 804 1,234 
Indonesia 701 919 1,262 747 910 1,273 2,178 
Kenya 471 276 425 420 399 524 786 
Latvia 3,334 1,861 2,304 3,062 3,981 7,155 15,645 
Mexico 3,815 5,499 3,088 5,663 6,948 7,824 9,579 
Moldova 909 568 393 281 419 793 1,665 
Palau 5,581 5,536 7,385 7,260 8,005 9,446 10,480 
Panama 2,444 3,135 3,312 3,827 3,861 4,594 6,473 
Poland 1,692 2,450 4,072 4,371 5,177 7,954 13,863 
Rwanda 357 323 237 245 187 274 461 
Senegal 826 718 567 535 513 773 1,094 
Serbia 4,099 2,034 2,448 1,440 2,011 3,391 6,498 
Seychelles 6,410 7,781 7,899 9,548 10,143 10,553 10,759 
Sierra Leone 218 261 325 225 279 322 453 
Slovakia 3,120 2,530 3,938 3,801 4,540 8,884 17,407 
Suriname 1,848 1,846 2,384 2,428 2,789 4,390 6,855 
Syria 895 1,147 1,026 1,113 1,282 1,563 2,583 
Taiwan 8,086 11,029 13,376 13,535 13,370 16,023 17,372 
Uganda 222 180 304 272 257 350 515 
Ukraine 1,746 1,336 877 638 880 1,828 3,874 
Vietnam 94 180 320 358 425 678 1,135 
Average 2,764 2,802 3,302 3,582 3,962 5,372 7,566 
Sources: 
Taiwan: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
All Others: UN Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. 
 
 It is clear from Table 3.4 that most countries do not receive a very significant 
amount of military aid as a percentage of GDP. Serbia turns up again as a significant 
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recipient; this correlates with the U.S. troop presence. Other countries that receive 
steady support include Bahrain and Djibouti, home to strategic bases. Otherwise, 
there does not seem to be any significant trend. One of the interesting things is the 
data for Taiwan. According to the official data published by USAID that was used to 
compile this table, Taiwan did not receive military aid. One of the numbers that 
stands out in the data is the 3.2% of GDP that Georgia received in 2002, which 
totaled about 109 million USD. Of this, $64 million covered an anti-terrorism training 
program led by Green Berets, as well as ammunition, arms and other equipment.88  
There is also a spike for Bahrain in 1996, which can be explained by two factors. One 
is the establishment of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters. The other reason is 
unrest in Bahrain that some State Department officials attributed to Iranian support.89 
While the arms transferred were for the use of the defense force, Human Rights 
Watch reported that foreign-bought helicopters were used by the government to deal 
with protestors.90 Other than these few spikes, military aid levels were relatively low 
for the majority of the selected cases. This might be expected, as increasingly 
democratic countries should be engaging in less conflict and thus have less of a need 
for military aid. The total amount of aid given the selected countries over the years 
has changed drastically, from a low of just $15 million combined in 1993 to a high of 
$318 million in 2002. Even seen as a percentage of each country’s GDP, the average 
                                                
88 “Green Berets Land in Georgia For 2-Year Training Program,” The New York Times, May 20, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/20/world/green-berets-land-in-georgia-for-2-year-training-
program.html. 
89 Kenneth Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U . S . Policy, 2008. 
90 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, 1997. 
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amounts of aid follow the total amount of aid. Unlike democratization and per capita 
GDP, military aid is not steadily increasing over this time period. 
Table 3.4: U.S. Military Aid to Selected Countries (% of country’s GDP) 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Albania 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.02 
Bahamas 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.16 
Bahrain 0.00 0.01 1.35 0.27 0.46 0.18 0.02 
Cape Verde 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
D. R. Congo 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Djibouti 0.49 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.28 0.66 0.24 
Estonia 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01 
Georgia 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.33 3.20 0.21 0.08 
Ghana 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kenya 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.00 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.01 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.02 
Palau 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Rwanda 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.01 
Senegal 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Serbia 0.93 0.00 1.88 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seychelles 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.46 0.01 
Sierra Leone 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Suriname 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Syria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Uganda 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Ukraine 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total (millions 
USD) 23.9 15.1 153.0 141.1 317.6 210.3 124.9 
Average 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.02 
Sources: 
U.S. Military Aid:  
USAID, Detailed Foreign Assistance Data. 
GDP: 
Taiwan: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
Djibouti, Estonia, Serbia: USDA Economic Research Bureau, International Macroeconomic Data 
Set. 
All Others: UN Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. 
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Table 3.5: U.S. Economic Aid to Selected Countries (% of country’s GDP) 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Albania 0.00 4.65 0.94 1.37 0.85 0.47 0.34 
Bahamas 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 
Bahrain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Cape Verde 2.39 1.56 1.48 0.57 0.93 0.89 0.35 
Chile 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Croatia 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.01 
D. R. Congo 0.54 0.00 0.03 0.52 1.48 1.66 2.11 
Djibouti 0.72 0.55 0.00 0.31 0.30 0.50 0.81 
Estonia 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Georgia 0.00 4.23 1.97 3.60 2.54 1.49 0.86 
Ghana 0.53 1.16 0.62 0.99 0.87 0.66 0.31 
Indonesia 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.04 
Kenya 0.47 1.39 0.14 0.62 0.68 1.36 2.35 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Mexico 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Moldova 0.00 1.40 2.60 4.47 2.41 1.04 0.40 
Palau 0.00 0.00 21.74 11.96 8.25 6.16 6.34 
Panama 7.49 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.05 
Poland 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rwanda 0.52 1.77 10.00 3.08 2.74 2.92 3.64 
Senegal 0.82 0.58 0.39 0.57 0.74 0.53 0.56 
Serbia 9.24 6.25 2.69 8.62 1.58 0.84 0.15 
Seychelles 0.91 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Sierra Leone 2.18 1.66 3.00 3.28 4.80 1.66 0.45 
Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Suriname 0.01 0.56 1.36 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 
Syria 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Uganda 1.28 1.62 0.65 1.25 1.61 3.20 3.14 
Ukraine 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.89 0.30 0.18 0.07 
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 
Total (millions 
USD) 850.1 794.4 834.9 1,457.4 1,358.1 2,174.6 2,635.8 
Average 0.88 0.91 1.56 1.38 0.99 0.78 0.72 
Sources: 
U.S. Military Aid:  
USAID, Detailed Foreign Assistance Data. 
GDP: 
Taiwan: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
Djibouti, Estonia, Serbia: USDA Economic Research Bureau, International Macroeconomic Data 
Set. 
All Others: UN Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. 
 Economic aid however, shows a slightly different picture. Here, the aid levels 
are significantly higher than for military aid. Table 3.5 shows the levels of economic 
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aid as a percentage of GDP for each country as well as the average of these figures. 
Also shown is the overall total of all aid distributed to all of the selected countries. 
The country that stands out the most is Palau, as it received over 21 percent of its 
GDP in economic aid. This is understandable as it was newly independent and 
continues to be in free association with the United States.  
Over the time period examined, the total amount of economic aid doled out 
increased significantly. It did not however keep up with the rate at which GDP was 
increasing, which explains why the average percentage of GDP peaked in 1996, then 
decreased through to 2008. This variable also exhibits very different behavior from 
the UDS scores. Whereas the UDS scores were increasing throughout the time period, 
aid levels fluctuated for many countries or remained so low as to be insignificant. In 
summary, the four alternative explanations all offer very different pictures, though the 
trends of per capita GDP do seem to be similar to the trends for UDS scores. 
Dependent Variable 
 In terms of the dependent variable, the treaty data was disaggregated, as 
discussed previously into economic and security treaties. The total number was also 
tabulated. The total number of new treaties for each of the selected cases is shown in 
Table 3.6, as well as the disaggregated numbers of economic and security treaties. As 
shown in the table, the data is for the years 1993 through 2011, because of the three 
year lag applied between the explanatory and dependent variables. Noticeably, the 
average country did not enter very many treaties with the United States over the time 
period. There are a few countries that stand out, however. Panama has by far the 
highest number of treaties. The vast majority of these were agreements for the 
temporary presence of U.S. military personnel in the country.  
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Table 3.6: New Bilateral Treaties for Selected Countries 
Country 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 
  E S T E S T E S T E S T E S T E S T E S T 
Albania 3 0 3 0 3 3 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 5 6 0 7 7 0 0 0 
Bahamas 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Bahrain 2 4 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Chile 3 2 5 1 0 1 1 2 3 0 2 2 1 4 5 2 5 7 2 3 5 
Croatia 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 5 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 
D. R. Congo 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 5 7 2 0 2 
Djibouti 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 3 2 5 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 3 1 4 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 2 2 4 4 8 2 5 7 2 3 5 
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 2 2 2 4 1 0 1 5 0 5 
Indonesia 3 0 3 3 0 3 5 0 5 4 0 4 18 0 18 13 2 15 5 1 6 
Kenya 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 4 2 0 2 3 0 3 6 0 6 
Latvia 3 1 4 4 2 6 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 4 5 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Mexico 2 0 2 9 1 10 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 4 7 3 2 5 0 5 5 
Moldova 3 0 3 2 1 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Palau 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Panama 4 1 5 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 5 8 1 33 34 3 50 53 0 24 24 
Poland 7 2 9 4 2 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 0 6 6 
Rwanda 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 4 3 0 3 0 0 0 
Senegal 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 1 3 2 3 5 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Sierra Leone 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 0 5 1 0 1 
Slovakia 2 0 2 2 2 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suriname 0 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 8 1 9 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Ukraine 4 9 13 5 11 16 1 11 12 1 15 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 47 25 72 44 30 74 23 30 53 25 42 67 53 69 122 40 87 127 25 50 75 
Average 2 1 2.3 1 1 2.4 1 1 1.7 1 1 2.2 2 2 3.9 1 3 4.1 1 2 2.4 
E: Economic Treaties S: Security Treaties T: Total of Economic and Security 
Sources: 
U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force. 
U.S. Department of State, Texts of International Agreements to which the US is a Party (TIAS). 
Kavass, The Current Treaty Index. 
Kavass, Kavass’ Guide to the United States Treaties in Force. 
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Panama and United States signed a Neutrality Treaty in 1977, which prohibited any 
foreign military presence in Panama. Most of the governments of Panama overlooked 
this treaty and it was not enforced, but it is now being enforced with a vast number of 
agreements being signed regarding the presence of U.S. military forces. By contrast, 
the higher numbers of agreements for Indonesia in the last decade of the time period 
were by and large economic, as Indonesia and the U.S. only entered into three 
security treaties over the entire time period from 1993 to 2011. Mexico’s higher 
number of treaties could be explained by its geographic proximity to the United 
States. The last country that has a high average number of treaties is Ukraine. Most of 
these treaties were security treaties centered on the securing and removal of nuclear 
arms and other agreements relating to arms limitations. Over the time period 
examined, the level of treaties did not increase significantly, with the exception of 
Panama’s high number of status of forces treaties. 
 The other indicator being examined is the amount of trade with the U.S. as a 
percentage of a country’s GDP. In Table 3.7, the percentages are shown for each 
country and year. The effects of geographic proximity may explain the fact that 
countries like Mexico, Panama and the Bahamas were conducting a very large 
percentage of their trade with the United States. While the overall volume of trade 
with the United States increased over the time period, the average, as a percentage of 
each country’s total trade, did not increase and in fact was lower in 2011 than it was 
in 1993, which means that the countries must be increasing their volume of trade with 
other countries at an even higher rate than they are with the U.S. 
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Table 3.7: Trade with the United States (% of country’s Total Trade) 
Country 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 
Albania 6.02 1.95 2.24 1.12 1.70 0.78 1.01 
Bahamas 92.57 57.62 46.75 65.55 86.93 80.97 87.06 
Bahrain 9.67 4.01 7.11 7.53 3.98 4.24 5.35 
Cape Verde 3.54 27.57 2.88 4.01 2.74 1.47 1.27 
Chile 19.97 17.87 18.19 18.13 15.94 15.75 16.03 
Croatia 15.55 1.43 1.80 1.43 1.91 1.64 2.63 
D. R. Congo 2.44 12.59 18.16 10.49 6.45 4.56 6.38 
Djibouti 5.96 4.13 12.02 25.96 15.36 23.02 22.08 
Estonia 4.37 2.62 5.61 2.40 3.66 2.17 3.70 
Georgia 14.79 10.12 12.36 10.18 12.17 10.19 8.17 
Ghana 12.14 12.36 8.48 6.76 6.08 5.35 6.87 
Indonesia 12.60 13.18 13.67 12.51 9.26 8.03 7.04 
Kenya 7.10 4.21 6.45 8.58 9.94 4.87 4.10 
Latvia 5.34 7.16 9.55 4.55 3.89 2.37 3.22 
Mexico 68.24 69.74 69.61 69.53 65.63 60.23 64.86 
Moldova 2.84 2.76 9.30 4.16 2.67 1.21 0.75 
Palaua -- -- 27.39 29.22 10.71 11.92 13.57 
Panama 53.52 50.76 48.57 44.65 14.95 20.61 23.75 
Poland 3.98 2.59 2.24 1.86 1.68 1.77 1.88 
Rwanda 3.32 14.47 16.42 4.25 2.82 2.37 6.72 
Senegal 4.33 2.53 2.80 2.59 2.86 1.78 3.20 
Serbia 0.11 1.76 1.97 1.39 1.25 0.79 0.82 
Seychelles 1.59 20.48 2.19 5.34 2.35 2.00 1.56 
Sierra Leone 23.88 19.73 26.90 9.23 9.37 14.28 6.28 
Slovakia 26.23 0.94 1.38 1.14 1.67 1.27 1.07 
Suriname 0.83 34.19 32.21 26.81 20.08 17.49 17.89 
Syria 20.29 2.58 3.67 3.95 2.45 2.27 2.32 
Taiwan 4.35 21.45 21.78 18.35 13.20 11.51 10.54 
Uganda 24.86 1.86 2.43 2.58 3.08 2.26 1.80 
Ukraine 4.33 2.82 3.13 1.77 2.32 2.76 2.38 
Vietnam 5.75 5.15 3.87 8.16 11.31 11.51 10.70 
Total (Billions USD) 141.5 205.9 275.3 309.0 392.5 511.4 633.4 
Average 14.35 14.23 13.36 11.24 10.69 11.13 14.35 
Sources: 
Taiwan: Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade, Trade Statistics. 
All others, trade with U.S.: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade in Goods by Country. 
Djibouti, Estonia, Serbia, total trade: Barbieri, Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, 
Version 3.0 
All others, total trade: World Bank, World Databank. 
 
a  Palau became independent in 1994 and no data was available for total trade in 1996 either through 
Palau government websites or through international organizations like the IMF and World Bank. The 
U.S. Census Bureau, however, does list data for the amount of trade with the United States. 
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Linear Regression Analysis 
After assembling the data, there were 208 cases where data was available for 
all variables. Since there are 31 countries and seven points in time being checked, 
there should have been 217 cases, but due to the fact that some countries came into 
existence during this time, data was naturally unavailable for several countries in 
1990. Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Slovakia, and Ukraine all became 
independent countries in 1991. Palau was also missing data for 1990 and 1993, as it 
gained independence in 1994. The cases for which there were gaps were excluded. 
I next ran linear regressions for each of the four dependent variables with all 
five independent variables entered into the regression. When I did this I found that the 
coefficients for per capita GDP and military presence came out so low, they appeared 
to be zero. This was due to the fact that they were measured in thousands, while the 
other independent variables were percentages that ranged to a maximum of 23. In 
order to obtain coefficients that were more easily comparable and in similar units, I 
rescaled the independent variables for military presence and per capita GDP by 
dividing by 1000. This results in GDP per capita being measured in thousands of 
dollars and military presence being measured in thousands of troops. The resulting 
summary statistics are shown in Table 3.8. This made it so that all independent 
variables were more or less in similar ranges and ready for regression. 
After running linear regressions for each of the four dependent variables I was 
considering, I found that there were significant results, some of which were 
surprising. In each of the regressions the constant came out to be significant. For each 
of the models I ran, I found that the R2 value came out to be relatively small for all of 
the models, the results of which are shown in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics for Political and Economic Cooperation 
Independent Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democratization 208 0.190 0.718 -1.459 1.576 
Military Presence 217 0.274 1.287 0 11.042 
Military Aid (% of GDP) 217 0.081 0.303 0.000 3.203 
Economic Aid (% of 
GDP) 
217 1.077 2.369 0.009 21.740 
GDP per Capita 217 4.1929 5.184 0.09 23.674 
 
Dependent Variables 
     
Economic Treaties 217 1.184 2.093 0 18 
Security Treaties 217 1.535 4.695 0 50 
Total Treaties 217 2.719 5.292 0 53 
Trade (% of Total Trade) 215 12.890 18.018 0.107 92.572 
 
Valid N (listwise) 
 
208 
    
 
When analyzing the total new bilateral treaties formed (Model 1), I found that 
democracy and per capita GDP were both highly significant at the 0.01 level, while 
economic aid was only significant at the 0.10 level. Of these three, only democracy 
had a positive coefficient. For an increase in democracy scores of 1, the model 
predicts that the number of treaties entered into would increase by 2.024.  
GDP per capita and economic aid, on the other hand, both had negative coefficients, 
implying that countries with higher GDP would enter into fewer treaties. To 
determine what might be the causes of this, I then looked at the disaggregated 
variables of economic treaties and security treaties. When disaggregated, economic 
aid was not significant in either case. Per capita GDP remained significant only for 
economic treaties. 
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Table 3.9: Regression Models for Political and Economic Cooperation 

























































R2 0.067 0.057 0.076 0.194 
N 208 208 208 208 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Examining the list of treaties I had coded, I noticed that there were many 
economic treaties related to restructuring of debts. If a country were to become 
wealthier, as measured by per capita GDP, it would be more able to pay its debt, 
reducing the need to establish debt related agreements with the United States. Also, in 
previous years, there were many economic treaties with regards to the trade in 
specific products. Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, most dialogue on trade is 
done in that venue, rather than on a bilateral basis. Of the countries in the study, Palau 
is not a member and the Bahamas, Serbia, Seychelles, and Syria are observers.91 The 
rest are all members of the WTO, so their trade in particular goods is largely dictated 
by its regulations. 
                                                
91 World Trade Organization, “Members and Observers,” Understanding the WTO, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
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Democracy levels for the disaggregated variables showed that it was less 
significant (0.10 level) for economic treaties (Model 1) than it was for security 
treaties (Model 2). It remained highly significant for security treaties. This outcome 
supports democratic peace theory, that states cooperate more on security matters 
when they are more democratic. In addition to having a higher significance, the 
coefficient for security treaties was also substantially greater (1.627 compared with 
0.397). Thus, in terms of security treaties, the hypothesis that democratizing countries 
will cooperate more appears to be supported. 
Finally, the fourth variable of trade with the U.S. as a percentage of total trade 
was regressed (Model 4). This model had the highest R2 of any of the initial models 
by a good margin. In this case, democracy levels were not significant at all. Here, the 
significant variables were military presence and per capita GDP at the 0.01 level. 
Military presence here had a coefficient of 2.454, though with a sizeable standard 
error, meaning that for an increase in military troops of 1,000, one would expect trade 
to increase by 2.454 percent of GDP. This can be explained as a factor, since the 
countries with a significant military presence (in the thousands) were either occupied 
by the United States during a conflict or have a U.S. military installation on their 
territory. In the situation of occupation, American goods are often imported both to 
support the troops as well as to help rebuild infrastructure. In the second case of 
military bases, American goods are imported into the country in order to both furnish 
the bases as well as to maintain the troops. These transactions would account for the 
increase in trade in countries with a higher troop presence. 
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Per capita GDP was highly significant for trade at the 0.01 level. Here it had a 
positive coefficient, which would be expected. The explanation for this relates to that 
for the economic treaties. Wealthier countries will trade more. The variable measures 
their trade with the U.S. as a percentage of their total trade. This may fit with the 
dependence theory, in that the countries remain part of the periphery so their 
increased trade will be with core countries. If they had already transitioned into being 
core countries, they would be able to diversify their trading partners out into the 
periphery. Currently, though the wealthier countries are making less economic 
treaties with the U.S., they are trading more. 
In the analysis of the regression, the cases that were outliers by more than 
three standard deviations were identified. For economic treaties, there were four 
outliers: Indonesia 2002, Indonesia 2005, Mexico 1993, and Uganda 2002. A large 
number of cases had no economic treaties, which meant that those four cases with 18, 
13, 9, and 8 treaties, respectively, were outliers. As such they possibly influence the 
regression model, impacting the significance of the results more than they should.  
In the second model, of security treaties, there were three outlying cases more 
than 3 standard deviations. These three cases were from Panama in 2005, 2008, and 
2011. Panama and the U.S. entered into an average of 36 treaties for each of these 
samples, much higher than the mean number of security treaties (only 1.535). Panama 
and the U.S. have had so many treaties due to their Treaty of Neutrality, as discussed 
above. These three cases alone account for over 32% of the security treaties formed in 
all cases. There is a distinct possibility that such a high number of treaties is skewing 
the regression, which will be addressed. In the model for total treaties, there were just 
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three outliers, the same three cases for Panama for security treaties, with an additional 
four economic treaties added to them. As a percentage of total treaties, these three 
cases represented nearly 19% of all treaties. 
Testing for Robustness  
Examining the fourth model for outliers yielded six cases. Mexico accounted 
for four cases: 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002, while the Bahamas accounted for the 
other two: 1993 and 2011. These have very high levels of trade due to their close 
proximity to the United States. Mexico shares a border and the Bahamas are just off 
the coast of Florida. It makes sense that both of them would have such a high 
percentage of their trade with the U.S. In the case of the Bahamas, in 2011 its exports 
to the U.S. were just one-fifth of its imports from the U.S., indicating that it relies 
heavily on the U.S. for goods. Mexico’s trade, on the other hand is balanced between 
exports and imports. Though there are valid explanations for their presence as 
outliers, they still may be preventing the model from having greater accuracy. 
In order to test the robustness of the four linear models, I trimmed the data by 
removing the outliers from the regression. This yielded four new models, shown in 
Table 3.10. Without the outliers, the models changed slightly. In model 5 for 
economic treaties, democracy was now significant at the 0.05 level and military 
presence became significant at the 0.10 level. GDP per capita remained significant at 
the 0.01 level, though its coefficient did shrink. In the case of security treaties, 
democracy remained the only significant variable. For total treaties, democracy and 
GDP per capita were still significant at the 0.01 level, while economic aid remained 
slightly significant. Finally, there were minor changes in the coefficients for the last 
model for trade, but the same two variables remained significant: military presence 
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and GDP per capita. The coefficient for military presence increased, while its 
standard error decreased. The coefficient for GDP per capita, by contrast, decreased, 
while the standard error also decreased. Generally speaking, the robustness model 
supported the conclusions drawn from the original model. 
Table 3.10: Robustness Models for Political and Economic Cooperationa 

























































R2 0.106 0.069 0.095 0.195 
N 204 205 205 202 
aFor these models, cases that were outliers by more than 3 standard deviations were trimmed from the 
dataset in each regression separately. 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 Since the data for three of my variables consist of counts of treaties, it was 
possible that a linear model was the wrong choice. In order to determine which model 
would fit the distribution of my data, I first plotted the histograms for the data. These 
are shown in Error! Reference source not found.. According to the histograms, 
none of my variables are normally distributed. This means that the linear model may 
not be the best model for this data, as it assumes the data is normally distributed. In 
order to see if there were any different results from the previous models, I ran 
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regression models using a negative binomial regression, the results of which are 
shown in Table 3.11. I also ran Poisson regressions, but the Poisson regressions did 




Figure 3.2: Distribution of Dependent Variables 
 
 In the negative binomial regression models, there are a few differences.  
Importantly, democracy remains at the same significance for economic, security and 
total treaties. An interesting change is that economic aid has become more significant 
compares to the previous two models and not just for total treaties, but for economic 
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explanation, according to the regression, it is still having the opposite effect as 
democracy. Democracy remains the only variable with significant, positive 
coefficients. GDP per capita retains its significance in economic and total treaties, but 
is now also significant in economic treaties. It has a small coefficient, but is now 
significant across all three variables.  
Table 3.11: Negative Binomial Regression for Bilateral Treaties 











































Pearson 𝜒! 290.236 553.55 350.57 
N 208 208 208 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Testing for Regional Effects 
 Finally, I decided to test for regional effects. I divided the countries by region: 
Africa, Americas, Asia, and Europe. These regions had 10, 5, 6, and 10 countries. 
Using the Americas as the reference point as these countries have a lot more 
interaction with the United States both in terms of trade as well as treaties and aid. I 
added dummy variables for Africa, Europe and Asia and ran the regressions again, 
using the negative binomial model for the bilateral treaties and a linear model for 
trade. 
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Table 3.12: Negative Binomial Regression with Regional Variables 
































































54.790*** 121.431*** 78.410*** 
N 208 208 208 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 Looking at the models in Table 3.12, we can see that the model continues to 
support the same conclusions for the Americas, with democracy being significant at 
the 0.05 level or above for all three variables and with a positive coefficient. Looking 
at the other regions, however we see some differences. Compared to the Americas, 
Africa and Europe show significant negative coefficients, implying that countries in 
those regions entered a lower number of economic treaties. Countries in Asia, 
however, were not significantly different from the Americas. One of the things that 
has not yet been considered is the fact that, for democratizing European countries, 
they have a large economy available nearby in the European Union. As a result, they 
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can be expected to move closer to the E.U. than to the U.S., which would explain the 
negative relationship. Many of these countries put through reforms to their political 
system in order to apply for membership to the European Union. There is some 
regional variation for the level of cooperation attained. 
 For security treaties, we see that democracy is slightly less significant than it 
was in the original negative binomial model, though still significant at the 0.05 level. 
For the Americas, we see that military presence also has a negative impact. This is 
due to the influence of Panama. It had very few treaties while it was occupied with 
American troops, but now enters into over 30 agreements a year, largely related to 
visits of U.S. troops. Since, for Panama, the number of troops declined from the 
11,000 to nearly none, while the number of security treaties went from one per year to 
over thirty per year, this will influence the overall model greatly. No other country in 
the Americas had even more than 100 U.S. troops deployed, and none entered into 
nearly as many treaties. GDP per capita has about the same effect here as it did 
without the regional variables. Here we see Africa, Asia, and Europe correlated with 
lower numbers of security treaties, though Europe is correlated with a higher number 
than the other two regions. 
For the total of both economic and security treaties, we see that military 
presence no longer has significance, but economic aid now has a slight significance 
attached to it, though its coefficient is quite small. Again, here the other three regions 
are correlated with lower numbers of treaties, with Africa being correlated with even 
less than Europe and Asia. 
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Table 3.13: Linear Regression with Regional Variables 
 (15) 
Trade 
Democracy -2.698* (1.466) 
Military Presence 0.332 (0.624) 
Military Aid  -0.449 (2.700) 
Economic Aid 0.935*** (0.344) 
GDP per Capita 0.917*** (0.178) 
Americas -- 
Africa -32.621*** (2.700) 
Asia -36.007*** (2.990) 
Europe -32.621*** (2.700) 
Constant 38.174*** (2.362) 
R2 0.650 
N 208 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Finally, examining the new model for trade, which includes the regional 
dummy variables, we can see that the Americas enter into a much, much higher 
percentage of trade than the other three regions, owing to geographic proximity. 
Democracy still has slight significance, but economic aid and per capita GDP exhibit 
much more significant results, with much larger coefficients. Of the other three 
regions, Asia shows the most difference with the Americas, while Africa and Europe 
are both correlated similarly to trade percentages. 
 In general, the differences in regions can be explained partly by factors like 
proximity to the U.S. or the European Union. One issue with this regional breakdown 
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is that each region has so few countries that one with large values for its variables can 
greatly influence the others, as Panama does in the five countries in the Americas. In 
order to find more meaningful results concerning regional information, it would be 
necessary to add more cases, though the models in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 still 
generally show that democracy is a significant factor in determining cooperation with 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 Across all of the models for the entire data set democracy is shown to be a 
highly significant factor in terms of security treaties and total treaties overall and to 
have some significance for economic treaties. This result supports the hypothesis that 
democratizing countries will be more likely into friendly relations with the U.S. as 
exhibited through bilateral treaties. There was no support to show that it will also lead 
to a higher level of trade percentage-wise. Interestingly, some of the alternative 
explanations unexpectedly came out to have negative coefficients, though upon 
reflection, they could be justified in some cases. 
 There are a few issues with the design of this research that may have led to the 
models not fitting the data as well as they could have. One of these issues is the fact 
that, generally, states do not enter into bilateral treaties very often. As was shown 
above, the mean number of treaties that entered into force at any of the points in time 
was less than three, which each of these points in time covered a three-year time 
period for those treaties to go into force. This is an average of just one bilateral 
agreement annually. Many states entered into no treaties of one of the categories from 
year to year. The numbers of cases with no economic treaties, no security treaties, and 
no total treaties were 114, 126, and 77 respectively out of the total set of 217 cases. 
This would be one reason to consider alternative measures of cooperation like voting 
alignments in the U.N. The advantage there would be that the fact there is a certainty 
of having quite a few votes annually and data on all members as to their voting status.  
Though this study focused on bilateral cooperation, in many areas, the venue 
for cooperation is shifting from bilateral arrangements to multilateral arrangements. 
This has the effect of reducing the number of bilateral agreements, while also making 
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it so they do not fully capture political and economic cooperation between two states. 
The WTO is a prime example of a multilateral institution that has taken the place of 
bilateral agreements between states on trade. The expansion of intergovernmental 
organizations throughout the world has also contributed to this, with examples like 
the E.U., the many fledgling trading blocs in Africa, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States being examples. 
While some support was found, one of the concerns is the low R2 values for 
the linear models. This may be due to the exclusion of other variables that were not 
considered. The foreign policy and factors that determine when and where bilateral 
treaties will be made are very complex, so one would not expect to get a very high R2, 
but there is definitely room for improvement in the model. 
Another limitation of this study is the small number of countries considered. 
This was largely due to time constraints that precluded the coding of the treaties of all 
countries. Generally, the other variables were readily available, though some needed 
to be combined and some additional data needed to be found to fill in gaps. Coding 
all countries would allow us to extend this study, which may or may not result in 
more significant results for the hypothesis. As mentioned before, extending the study 
to cover cooperation in multilateral institutions would be another option, though 
compensating for the multilateral aspect to see how their cooperation improves with 
the U.S. would be a challenge. 
This study partially supported the hypothesis that democratizing countries will 
cooperate more with the United States politically and economically, but as the world 
continues to change, the ways in which this occurs are sure to change as well. With 
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the European Union in existence and China on the rise, the United States’ share of 
world trade will almost certainly shrink. This effect could already be observed in 
diminishing average percentages of its share of trade with the countries in the study. 
The factors involved in this study are likely to change as well. Even without increased 
cooperation with the United States, the world has a lot to gain from countries 
democratizing. Bilateral cooperation and trade would be favorable to the U.S and 
have been shown to increase as states transition towards democracy. For this reason, 
it is important for the U.S. to continue to promote democracy, as it does actually yield 
results in terms of political and economic cooperation. Up until now, no other system 
has offered the same prospect of peace and prosperity and with the support of the 
U.S., the world can be filled with peaceful, cooperative democracies.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Constituent Measures of the Unified Democracy Scores Index92 
Measure Countries Years Scale Components 
Arat 65-150 1948–1982 29–109 Participation, Inclusiveness, Competitiveness, 
and Coerciveness 
BLM 5 1946–2000 0.0, 0.5 
or 1.0 
Political Liberties, Competitive Elections, 
Inclusive Participation, Civilian Supremacy, 
and National Sovereignty 
Bollen 60, 70, 105, 





0–100 Political Liberties and Popular Sovereignty 
Freedom 
House 
135–191 1972–2000 1–7 Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Hadenius 129 1988 0–10 Elections and Political Freedoms 
PACL 66–189 1946–2000 0 or 1 Executive Elections, Legislative Elections and 
Party Competition 
Polity 60–151 1946–2000 -10 to 
10 
Competitiveness of Participation, Regulation of 
Participation, Competitiveness of Executive 
Recruitment, Openness of Executive 
Recruitment and Constraints on the Executive 
Polyarchy 162 and 191 1985 and 
2000 
0–10 Free and Fair Elections, Freedom of 
Organization, Freedom of Expression and 
Pluralism in the Media 
PRC 64–143 1946–1998 1–4 Competitiveness, Inclusiveness and Political 
Liberties 
Vanhanen 41–155 1946–2000 0.01–
53.81 
Competition and Participation 
Note. The measures were drawn from the following sources: Arat (Arat 1991), BLM (Bowman, 
Lehoucq and Mahoney 2005), Bollen (Bollen 2001), Freedom House (Freedom House 2007), 
Hadenius (Hadenius 1992), PACL (Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibub and Gandhi 2010), Polity 
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2006), Polyarchy (Coppedge and Reinicke 1991), PRC (Gasioworski 
1996; Reich 2002) and Vanhanen (Vanhanen 2003). 
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